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the fIeld of the hIStory of	philosophy	is	rife	with	disagreements	about	its	own	
nature.	While	some	scholars	work	actively	 to	bring	historical	figures	and	ideas	









This chapter highlights a different corrective and complementary role that 
historically	informed	philosophy	can	play	in	contemporary	discussions.	Analysis	
of	 the	 development	 of	 key	 definitions,	 concepts,	 principles,	 and	 so	 on,	 often	
illuminates	problematic	prejudices	 that	 call	 for	 a	 re-examination	of	 the	philo-
sophical	 considerations	 in	 their	 favour—a	 re-examination	 that	 should	 involve	
looking at the relevant historical context in which the idea developed. In what 
follows,	I	demonstrate,	via	the	case	study	of	medieval	and	modern	conceptions	
of	mystical	 experience,	 that	 turning	 to	 the	 relevant	historical	 context	can	also	
provide	viable	philosophical	resources	with	which	to	complement	existing	dis-
cussions.	What	 it	 takes	 for	 an	 experience	 to	 count	 as	 genuinely	mystical	 has	
been	 the	 source	 of	 significant	 controversy;	most	 current	 philosophical	 defini-
tions	of	‘mystical	experience’	exclude	embodied,	non-unitive	states,	but,	 in	so	
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definitions,	principles,	 and	concepts	 are	 complex—and,	often,	problematic—in	
ways	that	should	impact	our	use	of	them	today.	I	focus	on	the	concept	of	‘mysti-
cal	 experience’	 in	 this	 chapter	 because	 it	 provides	 an	 excellent	 case	 study	 not	
only	of	this	point	but	also	of	the	ways	in	which	historically	informed	philosophy	




In	 the	 remainder	 of	 this	 section,	 I	 explicate	 the	 current	 philosophical	 con-
ception	 of	 mystical	 experience	 in	 the	 context	 of	 its	 20th-century	 influences,	
showing	how	prejudices	against	women,	emotions,	and	the	body	have	played	a	
significant	 role	 in	determining	which	sort	of	 reported	mystical	experiences	 fall	
under	 the	 	contemporary	 definition	 and	 which	 do	 not.	 The	 role	 of	 these	 non-
philosophical	factors	thus	motivates	enquiry,	in	Sections	10.2	and	10.3,	into	the	
philosophical	considerations	for	and	against	that	narrow	focus.
Let	 us	 begin	 our	 enquiry,	 then,	where	 everyone	 begins	 their	 philosophical	
enquiries	these	days:	with	the	corresponding	Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
article.2	The	definition	of	‘mystical	experience’	in	the	entry	on	‘Mysticism’	does	









3	 Jerome	Gellman	offers	this	definition	in	his	Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on mysti-
cism.	The	more	general	definition	he	offers	does	not	include	the	word	‘unitive’	but	is	otherwise	the	
same.	See	http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mysticism	(accessed	11	October	2017).
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For	our	purposes,	the	first	thing	of	note	about	this	definition	is	its	insistence	that	
a	mystical	 experience	must	 be	 either	 ‘super’	 or	 ‘sub’	 perceptual.4	To	 count	 as	
‘super sense-perceptual’,	an	experience	must	have	‘perception-like	content	of	a	
kind not appropriate to sense perception, somatosensory modalities … or standard 
introspection’.5	That	is,	although	a	mystical	experience	may	accompany	or	even	
be occasioned by sense perception, as when one has a mystical experience while 
watching	the	sun	set,	the	experience	itself	must	transcend	the	senses	in	a	distinc-
tive	way.	This	definition	explicitly	rules	out	visions,	auditions,	and	other	sense-
based	 experiences	 from	 the	 category	 of	 mystical	 experience:	 ‘[p]ara-sensual	
experiences	 such	as	 religious	visions	and	auditions	 fail	 to	make	an	experience	
mystical’6.	To	 count	 as	 ‘sub sense-perceptual’,	 in	 turn,	 an	 experience	must	 go	
beyond the senses in the other direction, so that the experience contains little to 






ence in Varieties of Religious Experience,7	and	continuing	with	Evelyn	Underhill’s	
influential	‘five	stages	of	the	mystic	path’	in	her	Mysticism: A Study of the Nature 
and Development of Man’s Spiritual Consciousness,8 modern scholars of mysti-
cism	have	generally	upheld	a	conception	of	selfless	mystic	union	as	the	ultimate	
end	of	 religious	 experience.9	Thus,	Underhill	 talks	 about	 a	 ‘death	of	 selfhood’	
in	her	depiction	of	the	unitive	life,	which	she	describes	as	the	highest	and	final	
stage of the mystic life,10	while	Jerome	Gellman	characterises	a	unitive	mystical	
4	 For	those	curious	as	to	what	Gellman	means	by	‘experience’	in	this	context,	the	following	comment	
seems	of	note:	‘Mystical	writings	do	not	support	William	James’	claim	(James	1958),	that	mystical	
experience	must	 be	 a	 transient	 event,	 lasting	 only	 a	 short	 time	 and	 then	 disappearing.	Rather,	 the	
experience	might	be	an	abiding	consciousness,	accompanying	a	person	throughout	the	day,	or	parts	of	
it. )RUWKDWUHDVRQLWPLJKWEHEHWWHUWRVSHDNRIP\VWLFDOFRQVFLRXVQHVVZKLFKFDQEHHLWKHUÀHHWLQJ
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experiences	 is	valid	has	been	a	 topic	of	fierce	debate	since	at	 least	 the	Middle	
Ages.	 In	 the	 14th	 and	 15th	 centuries	 in	 the	 Latin	West,	 for	 instance,	 church	
authorities	were	understandably	alarmed	by	what	looked	like	the	claim	that—via	
the	 insight	 gained	 through	mystic	 union—people	 could	 transcend	 need	 of	 the	
church	 altogether.	Their	 alarm	was	 not	 entirely	 unjustified.	 In	 her	Mirror and 
Annihilation of Simple Souls,	for	instance,	Marguerite	Porete	(burnt	at	the	stake	
as	 a	heretic	 in	1310)	 argues	 that	 the	 soul	 can	be	 joined	 to	God	 in	 such	a	way	
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Underhill	 focused	 on	 the	 psychological	 and	 philosophical	 as	well	 as	 religious	
aspects	of	mysticism,	and	there	was	a	general	post-Freudian	and	Jungian	interest	
in	psychologising	 such	 experiences	 in	order	 to	uncover	 their	 true	 significance.	
This combined with the rise of medicine as a science and increased interest in 
identifying	physical	causes	for	altered	mental	states	to	produce	working	defini-
tions of ‘mysticism’ and ‘mystical experiences’ from which physical and affective 
states	 were	 carefully	 ruled	 out—in	 part	 due	 to	 epistemological	 worries	 about	
how	to	distinguish	genuine	religious	experiences	from	hallucinations	or	medical	
conditions	such	as	epilepsy.	 In	 the	post-Auschwitz	world	of	 the	second	half	of	
the	 20th	 century,	 the	 search	 for	 a	 universal	 divine	 that	 undergirds	 outwardly	
conflicting	world	religions	gained	ground,	popularised	by	works	such	as	Joseph	
Campbell’s The Hero with a Thousand Faces	(originally	published	in	1949).	This	
push	towards	religious	pluralism,	epitomised	by	John	Hick’s	work	in	influential	
volumes	such	as	The Myth of God Incarnate	(1977)	and	God Has Many Names 
(1980),	 stressed	 the	 similarities	 in	descriptions	of	 selfless	mystic	union	among	
different	religious	traditions	in	order	to	argue	for	a	common	basis	for	them	all.
One	common	denominator	 in	 these	modern	discussions	has	been	 their	dis-
missal of embodied experiences as inferior states, and sometimes even as mislead-
ing	or	counterfeit	versions	of	true	mystical	experiences.	As	a	number	of	scholars	
have	noted	recently,	however,	in	ruling	out	these	sorts	of	experiences,	treatments	
of	mysticism	have	discounted	precisely	 those	mystical	 states	most	 common	 to	
women,	for	the	majority	of	people	reporting	such	embodied	mystical	experiences	
have been female.16
This dismissal of female experience has a long history. According to the widely 
accepted	Aristotelian	biology	of	the	Middle	Ages,	women’s	mental	acuity	is	com-


















mystical experiences in this time period, and their perceived relation to women and women’s bodies, 
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pains	 that	 speak	 to	 our	 personal	 desires;	 such	visions	 and	 ecstatic	 experiences	
frequently	accompany	‘other	abnormal	conditions	in	emotional	visionaries	whose	
revelations	have	no	ultimate	characteristics’.21	Although	Underhill’s	disdain	for	
the role of emotions and physical aberrations in the mystic life is clear, what is 
left	unsaid	is	that	the	vast	majority	of	such	‘emotional	visionaries’	were	women,	
and	 that	 the	 sort	 of	mystics	whose	 experiences	 typify	 the	 superior	 unitive	 life	
are	almost	exclusively	male.22	(It	is	also	worth	noting	that	the	‘ultimate	charac-
teristics’	which	 these	 revelations	 lack	 are	 those	 identified	 by	Underhill	 herself	
as	 essential	 to	 true	 mystic	 union,	 and	 that	 they	 include	 self-abnegation	 and	
physical	transcendence.)
In other cases, however, the negative associations between emotion, bodies, 
and	women	is	made	explicit.	David	Knowles,	 for	example,	describes	 the	‘pure	
spirituality’	of	 the	early	Middle	Ages	as	‘contaminated	by	another	current,	 that	
of a more emotional and idiosyncratic form of devotion … deriving partly from 
the	 influence	 of	 some	 of	 the	 women	 saints	 of	 the	 fourteenth	 century,	 women	
such	as	Angela	of	Foligno,	Dorothea	of	Prussia,	 and	Bridget	of	Sweden’.23 As 
with	Underhill,	 Knowles	 associates	 purity	 of	 spirituality	with	 an	 emphasis	 on	
transcendence	 of	 the	 particularities	 of	 the	 body	 and	 its	 affective	 states;	 unlike	
his	 predecessor,	 Knowles	 makes	 the	 connection	 between	 undue	 emotionality	








of Teresa in her largely critical chapter in The Second Sex on ‘The Mystic’, for instance, and Gellman’s 
lengthy	(2014)	Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy	article	from	which	the	definition	at	the	beginning	
of	the	chapter	(see	also	fn.	3)	is	taken	mentions	exactly	one	female	mystic:	Teresa	of	Avila.	Teresa	
is	of	obvious	philosophical	and	theological	significance—see	Christia	Mercer	(2017)	on	the	relation	
between her Interior Castle and Descartes’ Mediations—but	she	comes	a	full	century	later	than	the	
explosion	of	affective	mysticism	that	paper	focuses	on,	and	she	is	not	embedded	in	either	the	same	
sort	of	cultural	movement	or	religious	communities.	Perhaps	this	is	why	she	is	consistently	upheld	as	
the acceptable sort of female mystic.
23	 Knowles	(1948–9:	222–3).
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other	forms	of	religious	expression	which	are	portrayed	as	‘tainting’	the	appro-
priately	 	dispassionate,	 universal	modes	of	 true	mysticism	and	 connection	with	
the divine.
The same negative connection between women, bodies, and emotional reli-















there	 is	 a	 common,	 unconstructed,	 essence	 to	mystical	 experience	 has	worked	
against the recognition of women’s experiences as properly mystical’.26
Here	we	can	see	in	action	the	first	sort	of	corrective	role	that	historically	ori-
ented philosophy offers: an examination of the development of conceptions of 
mysticism	in	the	20th	century	demonstrates	how	it	is	undergirded	by	problematic	




tive experiences from the properly mystical; as we will see, these motivations rest 
on	controversial	claims	about	the	nature	of	God	and	human	persons.	Furthermore,	
as I show in Section 10.3, the broader historical context was where standard views 
about	mystical	experiences	embraced	embodied	and	affective	expression.
10.2. Correction in Context: Apophatic Self-Abnegation
Prejudices	 against	 emotions,	 bodies,	 and	women	 have	 influenced	 the	 develop-
ment	of	current	philosophical	conceptions	of	what	counts	as	a	mystical	experi-
ence.	One	might	well	think	that	these	prejudices	(which	have	been	around	at	least	
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affective	experiences	in	the	mystical	canon—after	all,	attitudes	towards	the	body	
and towards women were not better	in	ages	past,	correct?	One	would,	however,	be	
wrong in so thinking. This is where historically informed philosophy has a second 
important	 corrective	 role	 to	 play:	 although	 there	 is	 a	 strain	 of	mysticism	 that	
excludes	embodied	experiences	from	the	properly	mystic	life—namely	apophati-
cism,	which	generally	focuses	on	the	ineffability	of	the	divine	and	the	inability	





the	corrective	approach	described	and	 illustrated	 in	Section	10.1,	 is	also	easily	
generalisable	to	any	number	of	other	contemporary	philosophical	discussions:	it	
can	(and	should)	be	used	to	counter	mistaken	claims	of	‘But	this	is	the	way	things	
have always been!’ by presenting historical examples of real alternatives.
The apophatic tradition in Western Christian mysticism, for instance, has a 
long	 philosophical	 lineage—arguably	 beginning	 with	 Plato’s	 claims	 about	 the	
nature	of	the	Good	in	the	Republic	and	emerging	in	the	Middle	Ages	via	figures	
such	as	pseudo-Dionysius.	Developed	in	the	13th	century	and	onward	also	in	rela-













divine.	 In	 this	 journey,	 one	 of	 the	most	 important	 tasks	 is	 self-abnegation,	 or	








was before she was created.27
27	 Porete	(1993:	218),	translation	slightly	modified.	As	Barbara	Newman	notes	in	her	discussion	of	
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This	stress	on	self-abnegation	runs	throughout	Porete’s	work:	such	annihilation	is	
essential	for	the	sort	of	complete	union	with	God	she	advocates.	Meister	Eckhart	
also	 frequently	 exhorts	 his	 listeners	 to	 detach	 themselves	 from	 all	 individual	
affections	 and	desires,	 so	 that	 they	 can	prepare	 themselves	 for	 the	final	 act	 of	
self-abnegation.	In	Counsel	23,	he	states	baldly:	‘There	is	still	one	work	[after	the	
soul	has	detached	itself	from	worldly	concerns]	that	remains	proper	and	his	own,	






frequently	 caution	 their	 readers	 against	 taking	unusual	 physical	 and	 emotional	
states	to	be	signs	of	mystic	union.	Such	states	might	indicate	a	sort	of	spiritual	
progress,	but	they	are	not	themselves	the	goal	of	the	contemplative	life.	Thus,	in	




This is a direct jab at Richard Rolle’s earlier Fire of Love, which describes Rolle’s 
mystical	 experiences	 as	 including	 physical	warmth	 in	 his	 body	 (especially	 his	





same eyes with which they behold a cow’.31
Significantly,	in	all	these	cases,	the	God	in	whom	we	want	to	lose	ourselves	
is	 characterised	 as	 utterly	 unknowable	 and	 (at	 least	 for	 Eckhart	 and	 Porete)	





28	 Counsel	23,	Meister Eckhart, 280. 
29 In extreme cases, apophatic mystics even saw self-abnegation as allowing for an identity of the 
mystic	with	God;	when	no	egoistic	self	remains,	one	can	be	filled	with	God	to	the	point	where	one	
becomes God. When the title character of the 14th-century	‘Sister	Catherine’	treatise	comes	out	of	a	
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and	 	affective	 experience:	 for	most	 apophatics,	 it	 entails	 the	 loss	 of	 conscious-







in	 the	medieval	 period.	 Instead,	 particularly	 during	 the	 13th	 to	 15th	 centuries,	
when the Western Christian contemplative movement was at its height, a more 
body-friendly	 and	 affective	 mysticism	 formed	 the	 dominant	 tradition,	 finding	
expression	 in	 a	 host	 of	 religious	 communities	 throughout	 Europe.	 In	 Section	
10.3,	 I	 turn	 to	 this	 tradition.	Contemporary	 discussions	 in	 analytic	 philosophy	
of	religion	ignore	the	reports	of	the	vast	number	of	people	who	claim	to	experi-






this historically based approach to philosophy yields—most notably, rich points 
of	connection	with	disciplinary	fields	beyond	our	own.
10.3. Correcting via Complement: 
Embodied Mystical Experiences
As	we	 saw	 in	Section	10.1,	 affective	mysticism	 is	 often	 dismissed	because	 of	
its association with the body and with emotions. This is, however, to miss the 
primary	significance	of	such	forms	of	connection	with	the	divine.	Human	beings	
are	physical	and	affective	as	well	as	intellective	and	volitional	beings:	our	primary	





of embodied experiences, we are in a position to see the rich history of embodied 
mystical experiences reported in the Middle Ages as offering a vital comple-
ment	to	the	narrow	range	of	religious	experiences	currently	studied	by	analytic	




and incorporating insights from the past.
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In the case at hand, it is worth noting that the medieval emphasis on embod-
ied	 contemplative	experiences	developed	 in	part	 as	 a	 response	 to	12th-century	
gnostic	movements	 that	 either	denied	or	de-emphasised	Christ’s	 humanity	 and	





















This	 use	 of	 the	 imagination	 in	 spiritual	 exercises	was	 also	 closely	 linked	
with	 the	 idea	of	 ‘spiritual	vision’	 (visio spiritualis),	 a	 concept	borrowed	 from	
the	Augustinian	Platonic	tradition.	In	contrast	both	to	the	sort	of	material	vision	
(via	 the	 eye)	which	 is	 directed	 at	 physical	 objects	 and	 to	 the	 sort	 of	 intellec-
tive	 vision	 (via	 reason)	 which	 is	 directed	 at	 divine	 truths,	 spiritual	 vision	 is	
directed	 at	 images	 held	 in	 the	 imagination.	As	 such,	 it	mediates	 between	 our	
physical	sense	capacities	and	our	intellective	and	volitional	capacities;	physical	
experiences and intellective experiences come together and are combined in 
significant	 ways	 in	 spiritual	 vision	 (also	 associated	 in	 this	 tradition	 with	 the	
‘inner	senses’	and	the	‘inner	body’).	In	the	affective	mystical	tradition,	medita-
tive	 exercises	 such	 as	 imagining	 oneself	 present	 at	 the	 Crucifixion	 allow	 the	
inner	senses	to	undergo	spiritual	experiences	with	transformative	physical	and	
intellective/volitional	effects.	In	the	words	of	Niklaus	Largier,	such	meditation	






VAN ACKEREN 9780197266298 PRINT.indd   165 20/11/2017   14:16














Christ’s members—eyes, breasts, lips and so on—were seen as testimony to his 
humanation,	and	the	devout	soul	responded	to	this	enfleshing	with	all	its	bodily	
capabilities.’36
Consider the following vision that Hadewijch of Brabant reports having 
during	the	celebration	of	the	Eucharist	(a	particularly	significant	act	in	the	affec-
tive tradition, since it involves a mystical physical connection between Christ and 
the	person	receiving	the	elements):37



















affective tradition; see the chapters ‘The Body of Christ in the Later Middle Ages’ and ‘Women 
Mystics	and	Eucharistic	Devotion	in	the	Thirteenth	Century’	in	Walker	Bynum	(1991).
38	 Hadewijch	(1980:	281).
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Although	Hadewijch	also	frequently	describes	a	loss	of	self	in	mystic	union,	
she	 does	 so	 without	 downplaying	 the	 significance	 of	 affective	 and	 embodied	












preserving	 union	 is	Marguerite	 of	Oingt’s	 vision	 in	which	 she	 sees	 herself	 as	














ied	mystical	 experiences	 together	with	 those	 of	 selfless	 union—particularly	 in	
light	of	the	spurious	motivation	undergirding	their	exclusion	in	the	first	place.
10.4. Philosophical Morals and Historical Stories
So	far	in	this	chapter,	I	have	focused	on	the	corrective	and	complementary	roles	
that	 a	 historically	 oriented	 approach	 can	 occupy	 in	 philosophical	 discussions.	
First,	I	have	argued	that	analysis	of	the	development	of	key	definitions,	concepts,	
principles,	 and	 so	 on,	 can	 often	 illuminate	 problematic	 prejudices	 that	 should	




VAN ACKEREN 9780197266298 PRINT.indd   167 20/11/2017   14:16
168 Christina van Dyke






topics in other disciplines.
Consider again the example of the contemporary philosophical conception of 
mystical	experience,	which	picks	out	a	narrow	swath	of	the	sum	total	of	reported	
mystical experiences, and which correspondingly restricts philosophical inves-
tigations of mysticism in general. As I noted in Section 10.1, this conception is 
specifically	 characterised	 as	 ‘suiting	more	 specialized	 treatments	 of	mysticism	
in philosophy’41	for	its	focus	on	particular	sorts	of	unitive	experiences.	But	what	
about	the	addition	of	‘unitive’	in	the	Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy	defini-
tion	makes	it	suited	to	philosophical	examination?	Basically,	the	fact	that	it	picks	







in	 the	various	 languages	 in	which	medieval	mystic	 texts	were	written.	Careful	
studies	of	 particular	 contemplative	figures,	 general	movements,	 and	 the	nature	
of	mysticism	itself	abound	in	these	fields.	And	yet	philosophers	have	distanced	
themselves	from	these	resources	and	stuck	to	increasingly	specialised	discussions	
of idiosyncratic experiences. The recent Cambridge Companion to Christian 
Mysticism	contains	essays	by	twenty-two	scholars	at	various	career	stages	who	
represent thirteen distinct disciplines—and there is not a philosopher among 
them. The reason for this is simple: the ‘philosophical’ conception of mystical 
experience	corresponds	so	poorly	to	what	everyone	else	is	talking	about	that	there	
is almost no point in trying to engage in a common conversation.
Philosophers	 excel	 at	 biting	bullets,	 and	 this	 complete	 lack	of	 engagement	
with	other	disciplines	might	be	one	 that	 some	would	happily	 swallow.	By	 this	
point	in	the	chapter,	however,	I	hope	that	it	is	clear	what	philosophy	would	lose	
out	on	as	a	result.	As	noted	in	Section	10.3,	there	exists	a	rich	history	of	embod-
ied and affective mystical experiences—and a correspondingly rich secondary 
41	 See	http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mysticism	(accessed	11	October	2017).
42	 There	 is	also	a	contemporary	focus	on	distinguishing	 true	from	false	mystic	experiences,	which	
belies	epistemological	concerns	that	mystics	themselves	largely	do	not	express.	The	idea	that	it	would	
somehow	be	easier	to	determine	whether	a	super-	or	sub-sensory	unitive	experience	is	veridical	than	
whether an embodied mystical experience is veridical, however, seems to me to betray precisely the 
sort	of	distrust	of	the	body,	emotions,	and	the	people	most	likely	to	report	having	these	experiences	
that	makes	the	contemporary	definition	problematic	in	the	first	place.
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	literature	 on	 these	 experiences	 in	 any	 number	 of	 other	 disciplines—that	 could	
be	used	 to	enhance	current	philosophical	discussions	of	mystical	 and	 religious	
experience.	Realising	this,	however,	requires	doing	historically	informed	work.
The	general	applicability	of	this	particular	case	study	should	be	obvious:	phi-








menting them as necessary.43
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